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Lord Charles Powell of Bayswater
The Coalition Government has been engaged in two separate exercises which affect the future of our defence and diplomacy. At least they should have been separate. The first 
was the comprehensive spending review to deal with the deficit amassed by the previous 
government, requiring severe cuts in public spending over the next few years. The second 
exercise was the Strategic Defence and Security Review (SDSR), whose task was to evaluate 
the role in the world which Britain should play in the future and well beyond the horizon 
of the spending review.
The distinction is important. Britain is not facing a strategic watershed moment like the East of Suez 
decision or the end of the Cold War. We confront a deficit crisis and defence and diplomacy have had to 
take their share of reducing the over-draft. But the longer-term strategic agenda should not be dictated 
by Treasury spending hawks. I remember the advice which Harold Macmillan gave Margaret Thatcher 
at the beginning of the Falklands War not to let the Chancellor of the Exchequer be a member of the 
War Cabinet, because all the Treasury ever did was agonise about cost when more important issues 
were at stake. There are international challenges which have to be picked up and undertaken despite 
the cost, because they are as vital to our future as a nation as is spending on health and education. 
The political case for Britain to bear the costs of a continuing world role may be harder to make, but 
that is what leadership is about.
HOW HAS THE SDSR MEASURED UP AGAINST THIS YARDSTICK?
In terms of analysis of likely changes in the world to which we shall need to adjust, quite well. But 
they tell only part of the story. As important is our own innate perception of what our international 
role should be. The temptation is always there to ask why Britain should bother to take on the burdens 
and costs of an active and prominent role in world affairs when many other countries of our size do 
not. Why should we not be just another average, unambitious European country which free-rides on 
the European Union to represent its interests – and on pax Americana to protect them?
There are several answers to that question. The first lies in our DNA. We have developed over centuries 
of history the self-confidence that as a nation we are better placed than others to make the right 
choices and do the right thing. That remains a core instinct of our foreign policy.
More concretely, in a world which is re-nationalising with the resurgence of China, India and other 
emerging nations, we cannot rely on multilateral organisations to safeguard our interest, but shall 
need to remain significant players in our own right. That, not prestige, is why we should continue to 
pay the membership fee to be a permanent member of the UN Security Council, to maintain a nuclear 
deterrent and to preserve the capability to intervene militarily where our national interests are at risk.
There is also an ethical aspect. Having the capability to intervene in a Sierra Leone or other failing states 
is every bit as worthy as spending on alleviation of poverty and committing to the 0.7 per cent GNI 
target for ODA. Indeed, from the point of view of the poorest people rather than their often corrupt 
governments, it is probably more valuable.
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The real question is not ”why us?” but “if not us, 
then who?” The United States which most closely 
shares our outlook cannot reasonably be expected to 
bear the burden of global security alone, particularly 
as its fiscal and economic management woes will 
increasingly inhibit the exercise of American power. 
Other European countries by and large lack the 
political will to handle the big security issues. Unless 
Britain continues to contribute to common causes 
above its “quota”, America will become progressively 
less respectful of our interests. Our ability to ensure 
the best outcomes for Britain in a world populated 
by new behemoths will be unacceptably constrained.
So I have no doubt that the way the world is evolving 
and our national instincts and interests both point 
in the direction of an active and ubiquitous foreign, 
security and defence policy for Britain. Nor do I 
expect that outlook to change significantly as the 
face of Britain itself changes as a result of immigration 
bringing people of different ethnic origins, religions 
and regional interests into the British polity. Our 
composition has been diluted repeatedly over the 
centuries without weakening our vision of Britain 
as an outward-looking, globally-involved power. 
What are the practical conclusions one should draw 
for future policy? The first is that restoring Britain’s 
economy is as much a foreign policy as a domestic 
priority. An under-performing and debt-ravaged 
economy narrows our options and hobbles us from 
pursuing the foreign policy which our interests 
require. Margaret Thatcher demonstrated during 
her time as Prime Minister how re-invigorating the 
economy restored both national self-confidence 
and earned us renewed international respect after a 
debilitating period of seemingly interminable decline. 
A similar restoration of our economy will be needed 
this time and the Government has grasped that point.
It will remain no less important than in the past 
to stick close to the United States. Perhaps now 
election campaigning is over, we can forget the 
tripe about a ‘slavish’ relationship and recognise 
that a close relationship – whether special or not – is 
based on mutual interests. The United States needs 
close allies: Britain needs to be able to leverage off 
American assets and goodwill. This will be all the 
more important as the United States switches its 
attention to new concentrations of power in Asia 
and elsewhere among the BRICs and gives lower 
priority to Europe, as it is already visibly doing. The 
notion that we only count for the US as part of the 
European Union is redundant. Of course it helps 
that we are a member, but we count far more to 
the extent we are prepared to go beyond EU policies 
and commitments.
An equable relationship with the EU will be a high 
priority. There is nothing to be said for picking quarrels 
with other Europeans and everything to be said for 
making clear in advance where our red lines are, 
to avoid future misunderstandings. But the EU will 
remain too cumbersome and risk-averse to cater 
satisfactorily for our security: it can only be an add-on 
for our national role not a substitute for it. Baroness 
Ashton’s embryo European diplomatic service will 
be able to represent only unanimous and too often 
anodyne and minimal European views.
Early experience of the new National Security Council 
machinery looks encouraging in securing better 
cross-Whitehall collaboration and better focus in 
our international actions though it still has to prove 
whether it can succeed in distributing the total 
resources available for external action more rationally. 
The Foreign Office budget has been absurdly skimped 
in recent times even though it is miniscule in relation 
to other areas of government spending. This is short-
sighted and very different from the attitude of other 
front-rank European countries and the emerging 
powers, both of which realise the value of professional 
and globally-deployed foreign services to advance 
national interests and safeguard their citizens. 
The Foreign Office will also need to rebuild its 
formidable talents for bilateral diplomacy, not 
throw disproportionate resource into multilateral 
institutions. Pace the Treasury, a desk is a dangerous 
place to view the world from. The Foreign Office 
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needs to be out in the field and that is where our 
diplomatic energy should be directed, particularly 
to the BRICs and potential hot-spots. High priority 
is needed too, particularly in our present economic 
difficulties, for commercial diplomacy in support of 
British companies, though this work is already much 
further up the scale of the Foreign Office’s priorities 
than most people realise. It has certainly not been 
invented by the present Government.
Our lady bountiful Department for International 
Development needs to be re-nationalised and no 
longer regard itself as a taxpayer-funded NGO instead 
of as part of the government. It would have been far 
better if the Comprehensive Spending Review had 
diverted a portion of its funding to other forms of 
external action more directly in line with our national 
interests and priorities. Aid is indeed important, both 
as a moral obligation and a soft-power adjunct to our 
diplomacy. But the amount has to be proportionate 
to the state of our national finances and ability to 
finance our overall objectives.
The biggest and most difficult question facing the 
Government was how much hard power Britain could 
in future afford to wield in support of its diplomacy. 
By all accounts it was a close run thing. The Prime 
Minister’s admiration for our armed forces and instinct 
that what sets Britain apart from other countries is its 
willingness actually to engage with effective armed 
force in distant and dangerous national security 
challenges, fortunately prevailed over cost-cutting 
and knock-kneed declinism. He was right too to 
recognize that in an unpredictable world it does 
not make sense to base our force structures on 
one particular prediction about the nature of future 
conflict, and that we must therefore maintain a full 
range of capabilities even if on a slightly lesser scale 
than previously planned. That said, the affordability 
dilemma has been pushed into the future rather 
than resolved. And defence spending will surely 
not remain above the 2 per cent of GDP guide-line 
once the exceptional costs of Afghanistan drop out, 
unless resources for defence are increased once the 
economy recovers.
The objectives now must be to ensure that the Chiefs 
of Staff stop behaving like the TUC – or worse – and 
work in the national interest rather than Single Service 
interests; that the Ministry of Defence makes heroic 
efficiency gains, demonstrating that cuts can mean 
improvements; and that the little-noticed sentence in 
the Prime Minister’s statement on the SDSR: “My own 
strong view is that this [force] structure will require 
year-on-year real-terms growth in the defence budget 
in the years beyond 2015” will actually happen. 
Only then can we be assured of a national security 
policy backed up with real power and not just 
Ptomenkin diplomacy. ■
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